In “Is this How It Ends?” I quote Rebekah Koffler’s Putin’s Playbook: Russia’s Secret Plan to Destroy America:
I [Koffler] am not in a position to write about the scenarios based on actual wargames that I participated in [because of their classification]. All I can say is that my experience is similar to that of RAND Corporation analyst David Ochmanek, who has participated in RAND wargames sponsored by the Pentagon, and former deputy secretary of defense (DEPSECDEF) Robert Work. “In our games, when we fight Russia and China, blue [the U.S. military] gets its ass handed to it,” Ochmanek disclosed to the publication Breaking Defense. Former DEPSECDEF Work echoed Ochmanek’s commentary: “The simulated enemy forces tend to shut down [U.S.] networks so effectively that nothing works.” Worst of all, both former DEPSECDEF and the RAND analyst said, “The [United States] doesn’t just take body blows, it takes a hard hit in the head as well.… Its communications satellites, wireless networks, and other command-and-control systems suffer such heavy hacking and jamming that they are suppressed, if not shattered.” And then, according to Work, when “the red force really destroys our command and control, we stop the exercise, … instead of figuring out how to keep fighting when your command post gives you nothing but blank screens and radio static.” This is exactly what the Russian doctrine envisions and counts on — breaking the U.S. forces’ will to fight by taking away their technological advantages and crutches.
Since then, I have heard from two esteemed correspondents who have, between them, extensive and impressive credentials in the fields of Soviet/Russian studies, war-gaming, and warfare analysis.
This is from the expert in Soviet/Russian studies and war-gaming:
Games are designed for a variety of purposes — to test operational strategies, to attempt to elicit a particular response from an adversary, to probe the capability and fidelity of friends and allies, and on and on. They are not attempts at determining the effectiveness or vulnerability of weapon systems…. Instead, those [estimates of effectiveness or vulnerability] are built into the game as system constants — or perhaps as variables to be determined by some algorithm (or the throw of the die). Umpires are not necessarily even handed: often there's a thumb on the scale (or more) in order that the game not be terminated prematurely…. The games are not played to see who wins--that could never be an objective, nor could it be a coherent outcome. It's all about process — move, countermove, and counter-countermove….
[W]e don't "stop the exercise." We make what are called "branches and sequels" to get around it to keep the game going. The carriers don't all get sunk because that would end the game and we'd all go home, even though the game was scheduled to last a week...
Nevertheless, games can tease out ideas, tactics, and strategies that nobody ever thought of. That's their value — and sometimes (perhaps always) it requires the game to be saved (or resuscitated) to get to the gems...
All of which, as the writer suggested, I already knew. But it is telling that U.S. estimates of Russia’s cyber-war systems and processes seem unfailingly to stymie U.S. forces — according to Robert Work, a former deputy secretary of defense. Why would Work lend credence to a surmise that U.S. military forces would be shut down by Russia’s cyber-war systems? Assuming the harsh truth of the assessment about Russia’s cyber-war prowess, Work could only be pleading for more emphasis (in the form of systems, redundancy, tactical counter-measures, training, etc.) on efforts to blunt Russia’s ability to shut down U.S. combat forces.
Which brings me to the other correspondent, who is expert in electronic warfare. He sent me a copy of a paywalled article that appeared recently in The Economist (“Lessons from Russia’s Cyber-War in Ukraine”, November 30, 2022), with this comment:
It details, open source, some of the actions, reactions, strategies, and tactics on both sides between Russia and Ukraine. Surely there are classified versions among the interested parties, including the US. It is short on opinion and long on documented evidence. Certainly worth reading.
I take that as an endorsement of the article, which includes these passages:
Western officials say that Russia failed to plan and launch highly destructive cyber-attacks on power, energy and transport not because it was unable to do so, but because it assumed it would soon occupy Ukraine and inherit that infrastructure. Why destroy what you will soon need? When the war dragged on instead, it had to adapt. But cyber-weapons are not like physical ones that can simply be wheeled around to point at another target and replenished with ammunition. Rather, they have to be tailored specifically to particular targets….
“Russia is almost certainly capable of cyber-attacks of greater scale and consequence than events in Ukraine would have one believe,” notes Mr Cattler. The war “has not yet involved both sides using top-end offensive cyber-capabilities against each other”, agrees Mr Willett.
If all this is true, those capabilities might yet be unleashed. The sabotage of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines in September, and missile attacks on Ukraine’s power grid, suggest that the Kremlin’s appetite for risk is growing. There are signs of this in the cyber-domain, too. One British official says that Russia, mindful of the NotPetya incident, was keen at first to confine its attacks to Ukraine, to avoid picking a fight with NATO. But that may be changing. In late September Sandworm launched the first intentional attack on targets in a NATO-country, with “Prestige”, a disruptive piece of malware that was directed at transport and logistics in Poland, a hub for arms supplies to Ukraine.
I am in no position to make technical judgments about such matters, but the thrust of what I have presented here leaves me worried that the U.S. has been deterred from engaging in direct combat with Russia, short of nuclear warfare.
And there, I believe, Russia also holds the edge because Putin (and presumably, his military commanders) is willing to make the first move. (See this, for example.) Putin probably believes — and rightly so — that U.S. “leaders” would not respond to a nuclear attack of any kind by Russia — not even by threatening a limited retaliatory strike. To threaten retaliation, let alone to undertake it, would lead Russia to conduct a massive nuclear strike (but not one that would involve its ultimate deterrent, the Russian fleet of submarines armed with ICBMS). And that would end in devastation that Americans cannot brook. And U.S. “leaders” know it.
As I said recently in another connection: “Woke” is weak, and Putin knows it.