The Meaning of the War in Ukraine
It points to a new and more effective US/NATO strategy toward Russia.
What is Putin’s strategic objective for Russia? I believe it is a “greater Russia” which is strong enough economically and militarily to (a) leverage its natural resources to its economic advantage and (b) play hardball successfully when NATO or its key members try to thwart Putin’s strategic aims. “Greater Russia” must therefore include key regions of Ukraine — or perhaps Ukraine entirely — because of Ukraine’s access to the Black Sea and its natural resources. One way to think of the invasion of Ukraine is as a complement to Russia’s de facto control of Crimea, which is also consistent with the “greater Russia” objective.
In view of that, an invasion of Ukraine was almost inevitable. The NATO-Ukraine flirtation made it a certainty. Putin judged — correctly (thus far) — that neither NATO as a whole or the US (perhaps in concert with some other members of NATO) would intervene directly with combat forces. His nuke-rattling is probably an unnecessary bit of breast-beating because US/NATO wouldn’t risk direct combat that might lead to the use of nukes. Putin will resort to tactical nukes (though probably in a limited way) only if (a) he is in danger of failing to secure at least key portions of Ukraine and (b) that failure is clearly (to him) the result of US/NATO assistance to Ukraine (which includes but isn’t limited to intelligence sharing).
If Putin fails, it may well be because Russia’s armed forces aren’t up to the task. But would Putin come to that assessment, or would he blame the US/NATO? I suspect that he would do the latter.
In viw of that, US/NATO must do two things. First, continue to lambaste Putin publicly so that his role as the “bad guy” is (mostly) unquestioned in the West. Second, continue to help Ukraine (to do otherwise would be bad p.r. and a overt sign of weakness). But US/NATO should take care to avoid actions that might cause Putin to conclude that he failed because of US/NATO interference. I don’t lightly suggest tactical caution, but a temporary loss is better than a permanent one — a devasting nuclear exchange between US/NATO and Russia. (I am reminded here of Churchill’s decision not to warn the citizens of Coventry about a massive air raid because doing so probably would have compromised the Ultra program and resulted in a far greater loss of Allied lives in the course of World War II, if not defeat for the Allies.)
By the same token, it is imperative that the US/NATO grow some backbone and let Putin know that what he has in mind for “greater Russia” is matched by NATO’s commitment to the security of its member nations. Letting Putin know means policy declarations to that effect, firm commitments to building up NATO’s military strength (Europe still needs to pull more weight), and the “natural” expansion of NATO to include Finland and Sweden. (Does Putin really want to go to war over the inclusion in NATO of Sweden and Finland? I doubt it. Their admission to NATO would be a clear signal to Putin that he might have a free hand in “greater Russia”, but that’s it.)
In addition to that, US/NATO must convince Putin (and Xi and the ayatollahs) that it is economically prepared for a long cold war. Which means that Western leaders must abandon their futile and fatuous pursuit of “green” energy and drill for oil, mine coal, and build nuclear power plants. That is to say, they should do what President Trump was doing, namely, making America energy-independent. The hard-core climate alarmists would hate a policy shirt toward economic sanity, but it would win the hearts and minds of the vast majority of US/NATO citizens who are bearing the economic burden of high energy prices that their own “leaders” thrust upon them.
In sum, though it pains me to admit it, I’m suggesting something like a new Iron Curtain, where the curtain is designed and built by the West. The new status quo would resemble that of the 1950s and 1960s, when the US/NATO declined to interfere in matters behind the original Iron Curtain (e.g., the suppression of the 1956 uprising in Hungary and the “Prague Spring” of 1968). But the new Iron Curtain would not only block Russian moves to the west but also to the south and southeast (that is moves that might compromise US/NATO access to oil from sources other than Iran).
The new Iron Curtain would be a semipermeable membrane, allowing trade with Russia where it is mutually beneficial. And, with a sufficient show of conventional and nuclear strength by US/NATO, the new status quo wouldn’t engender constant dread about Russia’s ability to disrupt the affairs of US/NATO. Deterred is deterred.