An Addendum to "Grand Strategy": Neo-Isolationism
The U.S. needs a forward defense, but not interventionist misadventures.
In “A Grand Strategy for the United States”, I call for a grand strategy that guarantees to the citizens of the United States several things, in descending order of importance:
Security from domination by foreign powers, whether through military conquest, military threats, or economic threats backed by military might.
Assured access to those economic goods (e.g., oil) that have a significant effect on Americans’ well-being.
The ability of Americans to trade freely with parties in other nations, but not to the extent that such trade creates dependence on potential enemies (e.g., Russia and China).
The ability of Americans to travel freely and safely, for business or pleasure.
Further,
A grand strategy should
be rooted in a conception of Americans’ interests (e.g., continued access to foreign oil for as long as it remains an efficient source of energy);
take into account the present and likely future threats to those interests — threats both specific (e.g., Islamic terrorism) and generic (e.g., attacks on vital networks, such as transportation, energy generation and transmission, and telecommunications);
provide a template against which the adequacy of U.S. security programs defense forces can be assessed (e.g., adequate for conventional combat against organized armies but inadequate for damage control in the event of a cyber-attack on government computing networks);
point to specific, technologically feasible, program and budget recommendations for shoring up areas of weakness.
….
It may be possible to devise and implement a grand strategy based on military disengagement from the wider world — one that focuses on homeland defense, rapid responses to emerging overseas threats, and nuclear retaliation. But disengagement is not the proper starting point.
Any strategy that cedes forward defenses and preemption can be viewed by an adversary as an invitation to seize (or be capable of seizing) critical masses of land, water, and space, to the grave disadvantage of Americans’ interests. Forward defenses and preemption — like them or not — can prove more effective and less costly than reactive defense postures.
Some enemies cannot and will not be deterred. They must be contained — and, when necessary — struck before they can strike or abet others with a penchant for anti-American violence.
What I do not mean by “forward defenses” and “preemption” is involvement in dubious conflicts like the one in Ukraine. What have American citizens gained from the involvment of the U.S. and NATO? Higher food prices, higher fuel prices (which had already been rising because of Western “leaders” futile war on “climate change”), a massive bill for arming Ukraine, and the possibility of a wider war involving nuclear weapons, that’s what.
The war in Ukraine is not an instance of the kind of forward defense or preemption that would servce vital U.S. interests. It is a costly sideshow that detracts from the ability of the U.S. to prepare for a real showdown with Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea — a showdown that has been made more likely by the rush to arrange an unnecessary confrontation with Putin.. There are, in fact, good reasons to believe that (a) he is actually trying to protect Russia and Russians and (b) he has the facts of history on his side.
With that in mind, I return to “The Meaning of the War in Ukraine”, where I wrote this:
US/NATO must convince Putin (and Xi and the ayatollahs) that it is economically prepared for a long cold war. Which means that Western leaders must abandon their futile and fatuous pursuit of “green” energy and drill for oil, mine coal, and build nuclear power plants. That is to say, they should do what President Trump was doing, namely, making America energy-independent. The hard-core climate alarmists would hate a policy shirt toward economic sanity, but it would win the hearts and minds of the vast majority of US/NATO citizens who are bearing the economic burden of high energy prices that their own “leaders” thrust upon them.
In sum, though it pains me to admit it, I’m suggesting something like a new Iron Curtain, where the curtain is designed and built by the West. The new status quo would resemble that of the 1950s and 1960s, when the US/NATO declined to interfere in matters behind the original Iron Curtain (e.g., the suppression of the 1956 uprising in Hungary and the “Prague Spring” of 1968). But the new Iron Curtain would not only block Russian moves to the west but also to the south and southeast (that is moves that might compromise US/NATO access to oil from sources other than Iran).
The new Iron Curtain would be a semipermeable membrane, allowing trade with Russia where it is mutually beneficial. And, with a sufficient show of conventional and nuclear strength by US/NATO, the new status quo wouldn’t engender constant dread about Russia’s ability to disrupt the affairs of US/NATO. Deterred is deterred.
In sum, don’t piddle away American’s forces and fortunes on side shows. Prevent the “big show” — a concerted economic-military attack on U.S. interests — by possessing more than enough means to end it quickly. Which translates into deterring it in the first place (but ending it quickly if deterrence fails.)
This is neo-isolationism in the sense that it eschews military adventures that aren’t worth the price paid by Americans. But it is not isolationism of the old-fashioned kind. Forces would be deployed forward (in space, on land, and in the oceans) to shorten reaction times and remind our adversaries that we are there, big stick in hand. Americans and American businesses would continue to be engaged with the world, in travel and trade, with the exception that America would become (once again) energy-independent.